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Zusammenfassung 
 
Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse steht die Beziehung von Sicherheitspolitik und humanitärer Hil-
fe, zwei Politikfelder mit unterschiedlichen Aufgaben. Im Falle innerstaatlicher Gewalt 
nimmt die Nähe zwischen ihnen zu, wo sie – zumindest aus humanitärer Sicht - doch am 
größten sein sollte. Dieses Argument geht von der Komplementaritätsbeziehung aus, die das 
Verhältnis zwischen den staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Akteuren im Politikfeld der hu-
manitären Hilfe kennzeichnet. Das Kernargument ist, dass die „Politisierung von oben“, die 
kennzeichnend für die Entwicklung der letzten Jahre im humanitären Bereich war, unvoll-
ständig ist. Bislang sieht es so aus, als würden sicherheitspolitische Erwägungen diesen Pro-
zess der Unterordnung der humanitären Hilfe begünstigen. Notwendig ist die „Politisierung 
von unten“, d.h., die gesellschaftlichen Akteure müssen zu dieser Tendenz von oben ein Ge-
gengewicht bilden. Das Ziel ist ein sog. auf Recht basierender Ansatz im humanitären Be-
reich. Der entsprechende Wandel in der internationalen Ordnung ist sowohl aus der sicher-
heitspolitischen wie aus der humanitären Perspektive wünschenswert. Allerdings begünstigen 
die im Politikfeld der humanitären Hilfe vorherrschenden Strukturbedingungen diesen Pro-
zess nicht. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper focuses on the relationship between security policy and humanitarianism, two pol-
icy fields with different roles. In the case of violent domestic conflict they get inevitably very 
close where distance between them – at least from the humanitarian perspective - should be 
greatest. This is the argument based upon the model of complementarity characterizing the 
relationship between the state and non-state actors in the policy field of humanitarian aid. The 
core argument is that the politicization process which has characterized the developments in 
humanitarian affairs is incomplete. Thus far, security concerns seem to favor this process by 
subordination of humanitarianism. What is required is the “politicization from below”, the 
societal actors, as a counterweight to the “politicization from above”, the state actors. The 
goal is a rights-based approach to humanitarianism. Such a normative change in the interna-
tional order is desirable both from a security policy perspective as well as from the humani-
tarian perspective. The structural conditions characterizing the policy field of humanitarian 
aid are not such as to favor such a development. 
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1. Introduction 
State actors, as common sense suggests, decide and behave on the basis of what they perceive 
as national interest. Humanitarian actors, as they argue, operate on the basis of idealism. State 
actors want to reduce or eliminate the threats to their survival. Humanitarian actors want to 
alleviate if not eliminate the suffering of individuals, a consequence of the disasters they were 
victims of. This extremely simplified interpretation of security policy on the one hand, hu-
manitarian action on the other, is the topic of the following paper. At first glance it may seem 
that envisaging a relation which may come close to something like a partnership is totally 
beside the point. Humanitarian action being “nonpolitical” should be as distant from the realm 
of politics in order to be fully effective in the interest of the victims. This is certainly true 
from a normative perspective. Over the last decade or so, it has become obvious that what 
ought to be is not what is. A politicization process has taken place threatening to undermine 
humanitarianism. Humanitarian intervention seems to have been used if not misused as the 
conceptual bridge to link the two, a concept from the realm of security policy using as its last 
resort military power.  
The central proposition of the paper is that in the case of violence as the major cause of 
disasters the distance between security policy and humanitarian action should be greatest, but 
it is actually closest in contrast to other types of disasters such as floodings or earthquakes. 
Such a close relationship is inevitable because violence is a core security issue. For those rea-
sons the risk increases that the greater the emphasis of humanitarian goals by the security pol-
icy community the greater the probability that such a “humanitarian security policy” will un-
dermine the very basis of humanitarianism. This paradox can only be circumvented if a fun-
damental change in the foundation of international order takes place, i.e. a fundamental 
change in the institution of sovereignty. How likely such a change is and which form it should 
take in allowing for the adaptation of the presently existing partial humanitarian order is an 
open issue.  
The argument to be elaborated is that the changing nature of disasters and the context in 
which they occur have confronted both the state actors as well as the humanitarian actors with 
new problems. The strategies pursued thus far do not, however, seem to be terribly promising 
for such a new partial humanitarian order. This is why the paper has to be speculative. This 
speculative approach will nevertheless be grounded in a set of theoretical arguments and some 
empirical evidence.  
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We will first clarify the core concepts used, i. e. what we mean by security, humanitari-
anism and partial international order. We will then describe the changing nature of the disas-
ters that have brought security policy and humanitarianism together. This will become clear 
when describing the specific attributes of the policy fields of security and humanitarian action 
and the complementarity relationship that ties both together. We will finally identify some of 
the reasons as to why it seems so difficult if not impossible for such a new humanitarian order 
worthy that name to develop. 
 
 
2. Conceptual Clarification 
What do we mean by security, what does humanitarianism imply, how can one define the 
relation between the state and nonstate actors in the policy field of humanitarian aid? And 
what does the concept of partial order imply? These four concepts will be elaborated in a first 
step. 
The concept of security has undergone considerable changes. During the Cold War, at 
least in the Northern Hemisphere, the overwhelming preoccupation has been with the specter 
of nuclear war. Over the years, especially with the growth of transnational relations it has 
become increasingly clear that deterrence, the corner stone of security at least in the West, did 
not fully capture the variety of threats nations are faced with. The oil crisis in the early 70s 
demonstrated clearly an energy vulnerability. Theoretically these real world developments 
found their correspondence in the discussion how narrow or broad security should be defined. 
The proponents of a broad conceptualization (cf. Buzan, 1991; Mathews, 1989; Ullmann, 
1983)  try to capture the various levels and dimensions of security, ranging from individual 
security to international or global security (cf. Eberwein, 1997; Kolodziej, 1992). The narrow 
conceptualization (see Walt, 1991, for example) remains committed to the more traditionally 
oriented notion of state survival respectively threats to state survival.  
Various authors have rightly criticized the fact that the more comprehensive the concept 
of security is, the greater is the risk that it ends up becoming almost meaningless in that it 
includes everything from micro-level psychological elements (individual fears, for example) 
to macro-level structural properties. The narrow version, however, is equally limited because 
it remains within the boundaries of the traditional or classical concept of national security 
which relies in the end on the use of force as the “last” resort to protect the survival of a na-
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tion. This narrow definition is not satisfactory. First, that of notion is definitely declining in 
importance and second, there are many threats where the use of force is more or less useless 
even though the survival of a nation is in jeopardy.  
Haftendorn (1991) proposed a classification of security which consists of three types: 
national security, international security and global security. National security comes closest to 
the traditional concept in that this means the ability of a state to defend itself against external 
threats, i.e. provide for its territorial integrity. International security, in contrast, means, that 
only collective arrangements (including also regional security arrangements) can protect a 
group of nations from given threats. The East-West-confrontation with the two antagonistic 
alliances was such a situation, with deterrence as its foundation. Haftendorn adds global secu-
rity as the third category. Global security refers to the absence of threats that are non-
directive, nobody does anything specific to anybody but everyone’s behavior leads to threats 
that can only be reduced if not eliminated by collective agreements or to what she refers to as 
global governance. That is, only a collective change in behavior based upon an agreed upon 
set of norms can lead to reduce or eliminate such threat. Global climate change  represents 
one of such threats, water scarcity another (see Eberwein/Chojnacki, 2001a). This category 
seems to be unrelated to the use of force. A closer look reveals however, that global climate 
change in general, water scarcity in particular are related to violence. Scarcities lead to in-
creasingly critical distributional conflicts that governments or any other group can be tempted 
to resolve by using force. This seems to be the more likely, the more widespread for the right 
or the wrong reasons the perception is that increasingly scarce resources are the result of so-
cially or politically induced inequality1.  
The two components of security suggested by Haftendorn have as a common denomina-
tor the actual or potential occurrence of violence within or between nations which we take to 
represent the core element of any definition of international security. The two elements do 
nevertheless differ significantly. Whereas national and international security are endangered 
by identifiable individuals or groups of people (actors), thus presupposing an enemy, in global 
security in contrast an enemy is not identifiable, thus does not presuppose threats originating 
from a specific individual or a specific group of people. They are the unintended conse-
quences of collective behavior.  
                                                 
1  See the collection of articles in Suliman (1999). As well as Eberwein/Chojnacki (2001a) with an overview. 
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What do we mean by humanitarian action or humanitarianism? Brauman, one of the 
former presidents of Médecins sans Frontières, has made the suggestion to consider humani-
tarian action as an activity “intended to save peoples’ lives without discrimination and with 
pacific means in respect of human dignity so that the individual will recover her capacity to 
freely make decisions. The intention is not to change society but to help its members to over-
come a difficult crisis” (Brauman, 1995, transl. by the author). 
Brauman argues that states can impossibly be humanitarian actors because they always 
pursue specific goals, that is political goals. Therefore humanitarian action is at best an in-
strument of policy. Only nongovernmental actors can be humanitarian actors, presupposing 
that they are in fact committed exclusively to humanitarianism as he has defined it. One can 
easily accept this particular position but it is analytically not fully satisfactory. Because it 
seems to imply that governments, that is politics, should be kept away from humanitarian ac-
tion? The answer is clearly no. The distinction made by Leader (1998) into humanitarian prin-
ciples and principles of humanitarian action  helps to clarify this issue. Humanitarian princi-
ples refer “to the principles underlying international humanitarian law” (Mackintosh, 2000:4)  
and which are therefore committments by the states themselves. The core of these principles 
has been laid down in the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols in particular, 
international humanitarian law in general. The principles of humanitarian action, in contrast, 
embody the norms that should guide the behavior of the humanitarian agencies. As 
Mackintosh (2000:4) argues, “it cannot strictly be said, therefore, that the Geneva Conven-
tions confer rights or impose obligations upon humanitarian agencies”. But these principles 
are definitely consistent with Brauman’s definition and can be derived from the Geneva Con-
ventions (Mackintosh, 2000:13).  
The principles of humanitarian action have been reaffirmed by major humanitarian aid 
donors in their Madrid Declaration from 19942. This declaration is interesting from the con-
ceptual point of view for a number of reasons. First, it subscribes to the principle that humani-
tarian aid should not be misused as a political instrument, thereby supporting the notion that 
humanitarian aid is intended to exclusively help the victims. Second, the declaration also 
stresses that providing humanitarian aid is within the responsibility of the humanitarian ac-
tors, the nongovernmental organizations which are entitled to the support of the donors. That 
                                                 
2  ECHO, the European Union Humanitarian Office, USAid and the ICRC were among others signatories of 
that declaration. 
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means, thirdly, that the donors seem  to agree that they have to provide the means for the hu-
manitarian organizations so that they can adequately perform.  
In international humanitarian respectively disaster relief activities the relationship be-
tween national and international governmental as well as nongovernmental actors is one of 
mutual dependence. This specific relationship binding the state and the non-state actors to-
gether can be considered as constitutive for humanitarianism. The nature of this relationship is 
best captured by the concept of complementarity. What does complementarity imply? Hu-
manitarian aid is an internationally recognized area of activity. It has found its codification in 
international humanitarian law. This means that the states formulate specific rules or princi-
ples regulating the activities within the particular policy field, whereas the nongovernmental 
actors are responsible for the relief activities in the narrow sense (medical care, food, sanita-
tion, water). International humanitarian law is binding for the state actors and entitles the non-
state actors to some privileges as long as they comply with the corresponding norms. Quite a 
different matter is how this complementarity relationship is actually structured. It could be 
symmetric, i. e. an egalitarian  relationship in which the dominance of one type of actor is 
absent, but it could also be asymmetrical, characterized by the dominance of either the state or 
society.  
The concept of order implies that some basic norms, principles and rules exist which 
guide the behavior of individuals or collectivities. One could certainly argue that norms are 
always guiding the behavior of individuals or groups. Risse (2000) has reduced the variety of 
approaches or concepts that deal with this issue to two basic positions: the rationalist and the 
constructivist position. These two stand for different meta-theoretical approaches to interna-
tional politics. They do not represent substantive theories of international relations as Risse 
(2000:2) rightly points out. Rationalists concentrate on preferences and utility maximization, 
whereas for the latter social structures in which individuals are embedded are more important. 
This is why norms matter to the latter not only because they contribute to regulate behavior 
but also to the identity formation of the actors (Risse, 2000:3). Therefore the problem is not 
whether norms are important but rather whether and how they are treated theoretically. If they 
are introduced explicitly this implies the notion of order which in turn is based on the assump-
tion that regularized behavior can be observed which follows certain normative standards. 
This leads to two follow-up questions. The first issue is related to the effectiveness of such an 
order, which, by definition, is always partial (see March and Olson, 1998). Some authors have 
argued that effectiveness is a function of sanction mechanisms (cf. Zangl, 2001), others have 
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argued that the observance of norms is related to utilitarian considerations, i.e. externalities 
(Botcheva/Martin, 2001) The other equally, if not even more, interesting issue is, how orders 
are established respectively how orders change. In the first case norms respectively partial 
orders are treated as a given or as an explanatory set of variables. In the second case, order 
respectively the basic norms are treated as dependent variables when change is postulated to 
be underway. The latter seems to be the adequate perspective for humanitarian action in that 
the changes have been considerable.  
Let us briefly summarize the discussion thus far. First, security policy represents a wide 
area of state activities intended to secure the survival of the state. In order to avoid too broad a 
definition of security we have reduced it to the notion of threats to state survival. The concept 
of security has been subdivided into two components, a traditional one (national or interna-
tional security) based upon the use of force where the relationship between two or more states 
is one based on enmity and where the use of force is likely. The second component (global 
security) could be designated as a modern one where enmity is no longer present but where 
the collectivity becomes its own enemy so to speak because the consequences of its behavior 
threatens the survival of all. In that case only collective regulation which means cooperation 
will help to remove such threats (i. e. water scarcity or global climate change effects at large) 
by formulating norms binding all parties. The common denominator, as we have argued is 
that global security issues imply increasing scarcity affecting all. Scarcity may lead to vio-
lence. At the same time some security issues today are global governance issues.  
Humanitarian action, as we have defined it, is an institutionalized activity in the interna-
tional system, in which both national and international governmental and nongovernmental 
actors are involved, bound together by an explicit complementary relationship. The role of the 
state actors consists in formulating and possibly adjusting existing norms, i. e. humanitarian 
principles. The nongovernmental actors themselves are bound by the derived norms, the prin-
ciples of humanitarian action, which are intended to regulate their behavior. These two sets of 
principles constitute what we have called a partial international order, the humanitarian order 
in the international system. But whereas states are committed to stick to this customary inter-
national law, the nongovernmental actors are more or less autonomous in defining the princi-
ples of humanitarian action3. Of general interest is the resulting question what happens if the 
conditions for humanitarian action change. We would expect a delayed norm change as well. 
                                                 
3  As Leader (1998) has shown, the codes of conduct specifying these principles are actually interpreted differ-
ently by the different humanitarian agencies. 
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This means that any international order, partial or not, is not a constant but a variable. How 
the norms change will be the result of the strategies pursued by the various actors to adjust to 
these new conditions. The outcome will not necessarily be identical with what the actors in-
tended to achieve with their strategies. 
Theoretically as well as empirically the problem consists in explaining the interrelation-
ship between security and humanitarianism. A first answer will be given by first describing 
the changes in the frequency of occurrence of disasters and the changes across the different 
types of disasters. We will then discuss the specifics of the two policy fields, the policy fields 
of security and of humanitarian action and how they are related. 
 
 
 
3. The Policy Fields of Security and Humanitarian Action 
Is there a relationship between security and humanitarian action at all? It should not come as a 
surprise that there is no simple answer to this specific question. There is a direct relationship 
if humanitarian action is related to collective violence. The empirical evidence shows that 
collective internal violence has increased considerably over the last 40 years, with the increas-
ing duration of such conflict events being their main property, thereby establishing an uncom-
fortable relationship between humanitarian action and security policy.  
One can fundamentally distinguish three if not four types of disasters. Natural disasters, 
technical disasters and human made disasters. A fourth type are complex emergencies, i.e. the 
combination of a human made disasters with some natural disaster, a civil war in conjunction 
with a drought or famine for example. Under normal conditions natural and technical disasters 
do not pose any major problem for the humanitarian community in that access is willingly 
granted and that security/protection problems do not arise. The problems are quite different 
with those disasters that involve collective violence where access may be challenged. And 
even if the victims can be reached severe security and protection problems threaten both the 
relief workers as well as the victims. 
To clarify this issue we have to briefly elaborate on the incidence and trends of human 
made disasters (see tab. 1). Before 1945 interstate violent conflicts and wars occured more 
frequently than domestic violent events. That relationship was reversed in the post-World 
War II period. In the last decade of the last century collective violence overwhelmingly took 
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place within states. Initially, domestic violence was related to the decolonization process, e.g. 
wars of liberation and revolutionary wars. These internal wars were characterized by organ-
ized collective violence with more or less clearly defined groups, combatants according to 
international humanitarian law, fighting each other. The respective goals were to  stay in 
power or to gain access to power. Only in recent years did a new type of internal form of vio-
lence emerge in so-called weak or failed states. Jackson (1990) has argued that basically all 
the former colonies are quasi-states whose survival is primarily guaranteed by the interstate 
system. This is what he calls negative sovereignty in contrast to positive sovereignty which 
means that states are able to survive on their own. This characterization is not fully adequate 
in that it implies what Hasenclever et al. (1996) among others has called empirical sover-
eignty, what Thomson (1995) has defined as sovereignty in terms of state control or Krasner 
(1999) as interdependence sovereignty4. All these different concepts imply that states differ - 
in some cases dramatically - in terms of their actual level of interdependence on the one hand, 
their ability to control the various transborder relations on the other and thus their ability to 
minimize the interdependence effects on their own political, economic and social system.  
But the core problem is not one of control. For Jackson (1990) the concept of negative 
sovereignty means the commitment of the state-system to guarantee the existence of those 
states unable to do so themselves. Weak states are those states that do not have the necessary 
internal sovereignty, i.e. governments which do not fully command the legitimate monopoly 
of power within their own boundaries. Failed states, in contrast, are those, were functioning 
governmental institutions no longer exist. Instead a variety of groups pretend to represent the 
internationally still existing state. During the Cold War the dominant interest was to guarantee 
by all means the existing territorial arrangements as they had emerged after World War II and 
as a result of the decolonization process. That a number of these states was nothing but a vir-
tual reality was more or less ignored.  
                                                 
4  He suggest three additional categories: international legal sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interde-
pendence sovereignty. 
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Table 1: Disasters and Violence, 1950-1999 
Disaster Type 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 Total 
Technical Disasters 51 102 264 1.078 2.082 3.577 
Natural Disasters** 360 698 1.197 2.420 2.799 7.474 
Internal Wars begun 12 13 19 15 23 82 
Internal Wars underway 42 109 142 245 246 784 
Complex Emergencies *** 2 16 37 82 89 226 
Interstate Wars  
underway**** 7 12 10 20 4 53 
*  transportation accidents, industrial and chemical accidents, other accidents 
**  Droughts, earthquakes, landslides, extreme temperatures, fires, floods, storms, volcanos, insect infestation 
***  civil wars in conjunction with long lasting disasters (drought, famines) and/or a series of natural disasters 
with severe social consequences. 
****  The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (CDP) defines an interstate war as a contested incompatibility which con-
cerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 1.000 battle-related deaths per year. 
Sources: for natural disasters CRED (EM-DAT), for conflict see Eberwein/Chojnacki, 2001b. 
 
This became apparent after the breakdown of Communism when the major powers had lost 
interest in a number of their former clients. They suddenly found themselves left alone. The 
loss of external support in combination with secessionist movements whose legitimacy could 
no longer be denied given the support for democratization explains why violence in weak and 
failed states erupted. But in the failed states violence was no longer used as a means to gain 
access to power but as a means for the fighting parties to enrich themselves (Berdal/Malone, 
2000). These new types of wars represent both a challenge to security policy and humanitar-
ian action. As one can see from table 1, the average number of internal war years (internal 
wars under way ) rose dramatically from 42 in 1950-59 to 246 in 1990-1999. In these violent 
events the civilian population has become a major target leading to internal displacements and 
transborder refugee flows (Eberwein, 2001). One of the reasons is that in these violent con-
flicts the fighting parties do not need the support of the population. In contrast, in revolution-
ary wars or wars of liberation gaining the support of the population is crucial for success. In 
addition, the parties to these conflicts are not necessarily interested in neutral, independent 
and impartial relief activities of the humanitarian organizations if they have ever heard about 
it at all. As a consequence the humanitarian principles are constantly violated because the 
access to the victims and their protection as well as the security of the humanitarian actors is 
permanently jeopardized. As it turns out, in these kind of disasters the existing partial hu-
manitarian order is inefficient. Humanitarian principles are referred to in the various declara-
tions by the Security Council as well as the General Assembly of the United Nations among 
others, but little is done to enforce them.  
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This new type of war is of importance not only for the humanitarians but also for inter-
national security. The humanitarians take care of the victims, for security policy the issue is 
whether the occurrence of internal violence is, to put it in the terms of the UN Charter, ”a 
threat to international peace”. Whereas violence brings the two policy fields into close contact 
with one another, the way how the actors from these two policy fields respond differs consid-
erably. For the humanitarians the imperative to help is unquestioned5. For the security policy 
decision makers the issue is whether violence represents a threat, either to international stabil-
ity or to their own strategic interests or to both. These events are evaluated according to dif-
ferent logics in the corresponding policy fields. Politically, however, it seems safe to assume 
that security issues will dominate. Unless clear boundaries exist between the two policy fields 
that allow for complementary strategies, humanitarian action will be subordinated to security 
policy concerns as a means rather than a goal in and by itself. Before suggesting a number of 
propositions as to how both issue areas are related we will have to characterize both and iden-
tify their specific attributes. 
 
 
 
4. Humanitarian Action and Security Policy - How are they related? 
Providing individual or collective security is a core function of the state, helping people in 
distress in third countries is not. Security policy has a well defined purpose which is legiti-
mized in terms of the national interest, i. e. in terms of the interests of a well defined collec-
tivity: Humanitarian aid has such a well defined purpose as well but it is legitimized in terms 
of individual needs or rights unrelated to any specific nation or state. Humanitarian aid can 
also be characterized as a policy field in that it has been recognized as a legitimate area of 
activity. All the OECD countries, the major donor countries, are active in this area, all of them 
have institutionalized organizational structures to deal with humanitarian issues. 
What do we mean by a policy field? Initially designated as issue areas a policy field can 
be characterized by a set of goals, means, practices and actors. Policy fields not only differ 
with respect to their own internal functioning, but also in terms of their dependence from ex-
ternal developments and the ability of the actors of a policy field to shape their external envi-
ronment as well. As a consequence, each policy field has more or less well established boun-
                                                 
5  This is not to say that all the humanitarian agencies pursue the same strategies. They may accept the prevail-
ing conditions, they may make use of advocacy or not, or they may withdraw or not. 
 11
boundaries which determine its degree of autonomy. We will briefly compare the two policy 
fields along some of these dimensions.  
For security policy the long-term goal of maintaining or improving security is crucial. 
Whether the focus is national, international or global security, the goal of security policy is - 
or should be - a preventive type of activity designed not only to create a more secure envi-
ronment but also to prevent undesired events to occur in the first place. Humanitarian action 
in contrast, has in principle a short-term perspective. It can but react to disasters by respond-
ing with relief activities. This is why a preventive humanitarian policy can not exist6. This 
follows logically from the conjecture that humanitarian action can not or should not pursue 
any other goal than those as Brauman has defined them7. Victims are always the effect due to 
some cause. Humanitarian action can not deal with the causes of victimization. This does not 
necessarily mean that humanitarian action is in fact apolitical. As Slim (2001) has argued, a 
rights-based approach implies the politicization of humanitarian action, an option for a politi-
cal humanitarianism. If specified properly the victims become entitled with rights, thereby 
more or less automatically assigning responsibility to the states to protect these rights. This 
rights approach is a classical governance issue.  
Security policy is a classical policy field in that the dominance of state actors is uncon-
tested, notwithstanding that this domain also includes a variety of other state and non-state 
actors, nationally and internationally. The structure of the political system, as Risse-Kappen 
(1991) has shown with respect to defense expenditures, determines the degree to which the 
different political actors can dominate and the degree to which the societal actors can actually 
influence the political decision- making process. The policy field of humanitarian aid differs 
considerably in that respect because one of its characteristics is the complementary relation-
ship between the state and non-state actors. Both need one another. For humanitarian action 
that establishes a fundamental asymmetrical relationship in the first place. Major develop-
ments in this policy field are determined by the donors and not the various actors on the re-
cipient side. This is in fact consistent with the philosophy of charity or philanthropy. As a 
consequence complementarity in the sense of the division of labor between governmental and 
nongovernmental actors is a phenomenon predominantly established nationally as well as 
internationally on the donor side. The role of the state actors consists in collectively defining 
                                                 
6  This does not mean that disaster preparedness is not a preventive action. But by prevention we mean activi-
ties designed to prevent an event from occurring.  
7  As will be shown below, this specific view of humanitarian action has come under pressure from several 
angles. 
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and enforcing humanitarian principles. State actors on the donor side provide individually the 
overwhelming proportion of the resources necessary for relief activities. Depending on their 
political interests will they also have a stake in the observation of the humanitarian principles. 
Implied in this statement is the proposition that changes in the humanitarian system, nation-
ally as well as internationally, will originate within and between the donor countries. 
This leads to the issue as to how the relationship between the two types of actors, the 
state and nonstate actors is structured. We suggest the state-appropriation hypothesis of the 
humanitarian policy field. State appropriation can take two forms. The weak or benign form is 
that the state actors consider humanitarian aid as an integral part of public policy. At the same 
time the state actors stick more or less to the ideal type division of labor. The strong form of 
that proposition reads that the state actors dominate the humanitarian agencies and turn them 
into governmental contracting agencies. One could interpret this appropriation act from a po-
wer political perspective. Equally if not more plausible is the interpretation that this is the 
inevitable consequence of the democratic process. If governments appropriate considerable 
sums for humanitarian aid then they are held accountable. The way how these expenditures 
are legitimized becomes crucial. It can be done so from a national interest/security point of 
view but it could also be legitimized on the basis of humanitarian if not basic democratic or 
human rights norms. The result would still be the same: The donor states define where and 
how humanitarian aid will be distributed, the humanitarian agencies distribute it. The implica-
tion of this is a supply-driven model of humanitarian aid as opposed to a demand-driven mo-
del. The latter is the ideal type model derived from the classical humanitarian perspective. 
The potential vulnerability of the humanitarian agencies to state actor dominance is 
structurally due to the dependence on governmental funds on the one hand and on private 
donations on the other. If the humanitarian agencies do not share the same basic humanitarian 
philosophy or, to put it differently, if the humanitarian agencies as a collectivity are character-
ized by a great degree of heterogeneity in terms of size, philosophy, professional skills etc. 
this will inhibit a common position towards the governmental actors in that policy field. In 
addition, the greater the number of humanitarian agencies the greater the competition among 
them for the scarce resources. This seems to be the case. That leads to counterproductive ef-
fects. The humanitarian agencies are collectively in a relatively weak position to put pressure 
on their respective government in forcing it to formulate a coherent humanitarian policy. In 
other words, the humanitarian agencies as such are competitors both with respect to their dif-
fering philosophies, the nontangible aspect, as with respect to their material interests. This 
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makes them vulnerable to criticism from the outside (politics and the media). Self-criticism 
from within the humanitarian community is limited because of the competition among them-
selves. Criticism could harm them collectively8. Thus, even though nongovernmental organi-
zations have increased in numbers this has not weakened the states as such but rather, poten-
tially strengthened their position. The consequence is a potentially low degree of autonomy of 
the societal or non-governmental actors. 
Looking at the dependence from external developments the role of security policy, as 
was argued above,  consists in shaping the external environment in order to prevent undesired 
events or developments to occur and to achieve or strengthen desirable conditions. Generally 
speaking one could say that in principle both on normative grounds as well for political rea-
sons collective violence between or within states is no longer taken as an acceptable form of 
behavior. On normative grounds human rights violations have become an important concern 
in the internal and external security discourse. In some cases the states are willing to consider 
internal violence nowadays as a potential threat to international peace and security so that 
intervention is no longer excluded. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
a state is no longer sacrosanct. The security policy agenda has therefore been enlarged by in-
cluding a humanitarian dimension. The corollary is that humanitarian intervention or military 
force is no longer excluded as an instrument to deal with this type of problem.  
One can distinguish three strategies of the states to react to these environmental condi-
tions, ignore the conflict, intervene in the conflict, or act “as if“. The East Timor conflict led 
to a humanitarian tragedy which was systematically ignored for more than two decades before 
the UN intervened. NATO intervened with the air strikes against Yugoslavia hoping thereby 
to end the humanitarian tragedy that took place in the Kosovo. The Balkans are of strategic 
interest to the West which finally led to the decision to intervene. The humanitarian tragedy 
that has been going on for a while now in the Congo comes close to the “as if” type of ap-
proach. Humanitarian action functions as a substitute for a resolute political strategy to pre-
vent or stop among others the killing. Even though humanitarian concerns may be an element 
of the overall motivation to intervene these concerns are by no means the dominant ones. 
These different types of responses suggest a further fragmentation within the international 
                                                 
8  One of the reasons is that stereotypes seem to predominate with respect to humanitarian agencies and their 
activities, at least as far as Germany is concerned.  
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system that has gained momentum since the breakdown of communism. Some areas in the 
world are still of strategic interest, others no longer are9.  
What is true for the security policy field with respect to violence does not apply to the 
humanitarian policy field. Not only are the humanitarian actors unable to shape their envi-
ronment but they also have only two strategies to react, abstain from action or do nothing or 
act. Even worse, the humanitarian agencies are caught in two dependency relationships. On 
the donor side they have to rely on the generosity of the private donors and on the national 
and international governmental agencies for funds. On the recipient side access, security of 
the personnel of the agencies and the safety of the victims depend on the conflict parties in the 
case of violent domestic conflicts. The humanitarian agencies have only limited possibilities 
to force the actors to comply with humanitarian principles and to honor the principles of hu-
manitarian action (cf. Leader, 2000).  
Naturally, this provisional assessment of the conditions prevailing in the two policy 
field ignores the many complexities that characterize each individual situation. We neverthe-
less believe that we have described some basic properties that prevail. What can we provi-
sionally infer in terms of the consequences this has for the boundaries of the policy field of 
humanitarian action which could also be phrased in terms of autonomy? On the security pol-
icy field we still have to struggle with the problem that governments temporarily choose a 
“humanitarian” strategy of intervention when no strategic interests are at stake. Somalia is a 
good case in point. Any Realpolitik type of explanation fails in this case. The advocates of the 
relevance of norms in international politics do have a good point in that domestic factors do 
account for such a behavior. Both media reporting and the mobilization of public opinion can 
actually force a government to opt for a policy which it would not have chosen had this pres-
sure been absent. The assumption that this sort of influence works in favor of the humanitar-
ian agencies is wrong. Neither the media nor the public seem to be strongly committed to hu-
manitarian principles as such. Philanthropy or charity seem to be the dominant but short-lived 
motives leading to support symbolically or materially humanitarian action. Government fund-
ing and private donations for specific humanitarian emergencies clearly reveal political selec-
tivity. The external support is therefore threatening impartiality, neutrality and indirectly also 
independence. Structurally, the degree of autonomy of the policy field of humanitarian action 
                                                 
9  The “helicopter adventure” of the German government during the flooding in Mozambique was not due to 
the strategic importance of that country. Rather it resulted from the pressure of the media, was supported by 
the public, cost a lot of money but was more or less superfluous from the humanitarian point of view.  
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is low or, put differently, dependence is relatively high. The humanitarian actors seem to have 
run into a general no-win situation. Violence has favored the politicization of humanitarian 
action. Security policy intends to establish its hegemony over the humanitarian policy field 
which has devalued traditional humanitarianism without the so-called new humanitarianism 
offering a real alternative worthy of that name. 
 
 
 
5. Humanitarian Order and Change - A Political Humanitarianism  
as a Solution? 
With the predominance of internal violence in humanitarian affairs the politicization of hu-
manitarian action has become inevitable as we have argued above. The cause for the eruption 
of violence and the dynamics of violence proper (see Eberwein/Chojnacki, 2001b) are poten-
tially salient security policy issues whereas the victims as one of the effects of violence are 
the focus of humanitarian action. Theoretically one can separate the two, for all practical pur-
poses this linkage can not be ignored. The problem is whether the boundaries between the two 
policy fields can be re-established. 
Theoretically, the development of the partial humanitarian order can be interpreted from 
a Realpolitik perspective. The state appropriation of the policy field of humanitarian aid 
seems to be the logical implication of such a theoretical approach if state actors assume that 
this is a relevant political issue area and therefore of use for the pursuit of their national inter-
ests however defined. The presumption that power and interest can account for this appropria-
tion strategy is further reinforced by the fact that with the support of some humanitarian agen-
cies governments tend increasingly to include humanitarian aid conceptually in their conflict 
prevention and resolution as well as rehabilitation and development strategies (see Curtis, 
2001). Humanitarian aid tends to become an instrument of foreign policy (cf. Warner, 1999; 
Roberts, 1999). As plausible as this interpretation may sound it is probably wrong (Fin-
nemore, 1996). Rather it seems that normative considerations related to the new world order 
or the liberal peace paradigm as Macrae (2001) has called it and which became popular after 
the breakdown of Communism is at the root of this merger of humanitarian affairs with politi-
cal strategies. In our view the interpretation of the evolution in humanitarian affairs and the 
international security domain seem to be much better explained as a norm-driven enterprise 
where the increasing dominance of internal violence has actually brought the two policy fields 
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together. The adaptation process under way has not yet led to a revised division of labor be-
tween humanitarian affairs and security policy or international politics at large. This is due as 
we suspect to the lack of a substantive politics of humanitarian affairs by the states them-
selves (cf. Leader, 2001). 
As limited as the emergence and evolution of international humanitarian law was with 
the creation of the Red Cross, this approach, as limited as it was, can not be accounted for in 
terms of power and interests. It was a norm-driven enterprise (Finnemore, 1996) to which an 
initially limited number of states agreed. Did they intend the creation of an international hu-
manitarian order? Certainly not. The initial idea was the formulation of a number of rules and 
principles intended to humanize interstate war, i. e. organized collective inter-state violence. 
The function of humanitarian action was to protect wounded soldiers and those assisting 
them, no more but no less either. This humanitarian law of war did not challenge the legiti-
macy of the use of force but only attempted to regulate some of its aspects and thereby further 
legitimizing it.  
As Holsti (1991:343) has shown it is only in the 20th century that the states, in the con-
text of the League of Nations and the UN, for the first time made declaratory statements on 
the use of force and carefully specified under what conditions force could be used in inter-
state conflict regulation. Some of the League of Nations and the UN charter provisions can 
also be interpreted as the first timid attempts to introduce some democratic principles in inter-
national affairs or some principles of political global governance. Additional developments 
underline this trend such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Refugee Law, the 
Genocide Convention or the Convention of the Rights of the Children. In parallel humanitari-
anism in a more narrow sense was broadened with the four Geneva conventions and later on 
amended with the two additional protocols. This represented a major step forward in the es-
tablishment of what we have called partial humanitarian. This Geneva law (Bettati, 1995) was 
an extension of the then existing Hague law of war. The intent was not only to limit war mak-
ing but also to protect the civilian population as well thereby further limiting the behavior of 
the belligerents. These humanitarian principles were institutionalized legitimizing humanitar-
ian aid but no provisions formulated which would regulate the access to the victims. With the 
two additional protocols this gap was closed in that the right of nongovernmental organiza-
tions such as the Red Cross, as it reads, were granted the right to provide relief. But the access 
of the humanitarian organizations was linked to the agreement of the conflict parties (which 
no longer needed to be a state actor, another new element).  
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According to Bettati (1995:22) this Genevese law was further amended by what he calls 
possibly much too optimistically the New York law created by the United Nations themselves. 
This new approach is in his words indicative of the new world humanitarian order. The foun-
dations of this new approach are the General Assembly resolutions 43/131 of December 8, 
1988, and 45/100 of December 14, 1990, where the states are requested to support the activi-
ties of the humanitarian organizations (first resolution) and also demanding the establishment 
of free access through corridors to the disaster areas (second resolution). These resolutions are 
not binding, but they still represent a renewed if not new interest in humanitarian action and 
the obligation of the governments to take appropriate action when needed. Why would the 
majority of states take such a step? Symbolically at least a change in perspective became ob-
vious with Security Council Resolution 688 in favor of the Kurd tragedy at the borders to 
Turkey. The humanitarian justifications have since then found their entrance into a whole 
series of Security Council resolutions that led to “humanitarian” interventions in the internal 
affairs of among others Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Yugoslavia (see also Slim, 
2001). 
Domestic affairs in general (from the human rights perspective), internal violence in 
particular, can no longer be hidden behind the smokescreen of nonintervention. A process of 
institutional change is under way, the change in the institution of sovereignty or what Krasner 
(1999:20-25) has called Westphalian sovereignty or the norm of non-intervention10. Human 
rights and democratization have become common currency in the international political dis-
course since the end of Communism. At the conceptual level conflict prevention has become 
the predominant concern implying the prevention of violence in the first place, limiting its 
escalation and/or preventing violence to erupt again after it has come to an end. These new 
declaratory visions of international order are expected to be achieved through effective pre-
vention measures. Humanitarian aid has at least conceptually been included as a potentially 
useful instrument in this conflict management tool box (see Chojnacki, 2001). The policy 
field of development has been colonized even more radically. Analogous to humanitarian aid, 
a new orthodoxy of aid, as Macrae (2001:33) calls it, came to the fore emphasizing the impor-
tance of achieving coherence between development assistance and foreign and defense poli-
cies.  
                                                 
10  Philpott (2001:310) in his review of Krasner’s book criticizes him for the organized hypocrisy proposition 
because he does not explain why states constantly come back to sovereignty even though constantly violating 
it. 
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Are there any alternatives at all to this seemingly security policy hegemony? Leader 
(200:2) has suggested three different models of humanitarianism in the future: neutrality a-
bandoned which subordinates humanitarian principles to political goals, neutrality elevated a 
position which emphasizes universal legal principles, and finally a third-way humanitarian-
ism which amounts to a middle way position. Leaving the middle position out of considera-
tion, we will formulate a number of propositions related to the incomplete politicization thesis 
or, to put it differently, related to the normative change in the international system that could 
finally lead to the one or the other model.  
These changes, we would expect, will be the result of a mixture of what actors do on the 
one hand, the approach the rationalists, as Risse (2000) calls them, prefer, or due to the struc-
tural conditions, as the constructivists would argue. More likely is change as the result of a 
mixture of both what actors do and the impact of structural effects in terms of norms and in-
tersubjective meanings11. If actors’ interests and the structural conditions are given does the 
rights-based option suggested by Slim (2001; see also Curtis, 2001:15-16) present a viable 
option? Normatively, this type of model is close to the neutrality-elevated model. The other 
alternative Slim suggests would be traditional humanitarianism based upon philanthropy or 
charity which comes close to the neutrality-abandoned type. The rights-based approach links 
human rights with humanitarian law which is certainly not a terribly new idea (cf. Eide et al., 
1995). That approach establishes obligations towards the victims based upon specific rights 
such as physical and psychic integrity, or the right to life and dignity to put it in terms of hu-
man rights.  
Democratization, stability and security concerns with their normative foundations are 
the source of politicization of humanitarianism deplored by the humanitarian agencies. Is this 
due to a lack of respect for humanitarian principles and the outcome of a power-based hu-
manitarian hypocrisy? We believe not. The major proposition is that the politicization process 
so far is incomplete because political collective reaction “from below” (i.e. society) as op-
posed to reaction “from above” (the states) is still missing. But the politicization process is 
inevitable because of the normative changes underway. International normative changes, as 
Sikkink and Finnemore (1996) have argued convincingly, originate at the domestic level. To 
get those changes underway requires what they call norm entrepreneurs which will lead to the 
diffusion of the norm or norms and later on to their institutionalization. And that means in 
effect a political process in which the goal is to get public support for these norms or the norm 
                                                 
11  Risse (2001) argues in his paper for such an actor-structure mix. 
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change as we can observe it in the field of human rights for example or with respect to envi-
ronmental issues. 
The theoretical implication of that statement is that humanitarian principles need strong 
advocates. If humanitarianism is a major concern to the actors in the donor countries the con-
sequence would be to make a political issue out of this normative concern. Humanitarianism 
is not encapsulated in an isolated policy field but embedded in a wider global order or system 
of governance. If domestic violence is at the core then it is clear that humanitarianism of the 
rights-based type or neutrality elevated is only feasible if the changes in the concept of sover-
eignty legitimizing intervention under specific conditions become institutionalized. From the 
security perspective the prohibition of violence is central. From the humanitarian perspective 
the regulation of behavior during violent conflicts is central. Prevention of violence vs. hu-
manization of violence are the complementary foci of the two policy fields. The recently be-
gun discussion in terms of legalization in world politics (Goldstein et al., 2000: 385-399) 
seems to be the right direction. From the legalization perspective the issue is as how to further 
limit the behavior of conflict parties at all and if they do not comply as how to increase the 
externalities so that the costs of violations may in the end deter as many as possible of the 
perpetrators. That also implies sanctions. We believe though that deterrence which implies 
also a systematic conflict prevention strategy is the most effective approach. Violations as 
such can probably never be eliminated completely. Parallel to such an improved system of 
global governance in the security domain, the rights-based approach within such a global 
framework establishes a corresponding system of norms and their enforcement. The latter 
implies a politics of humanitarian action independent of security policy. There is no reason as 
to why this may not be possible.  
Clearly enough, these remarks are deceptively general. We are well aware that it is easy 
to formulate such postulates and extremely difficult if not impossible to translate from the 
world of the best intentions into the real world. Nevertheless, going back to the Sik-
kink/Finnemore (1998) propositions we will formulate a few propositions ourselves what the 
difficulties seem to be as to strengthen the humanitarian policy field relative to the hegemony 
of security policy. It seems clear that the politicization of humanitarianism is a necessary con-
dition for a rights-based or neutrality-elevated humanitarianism. This implies a) the knowl-
edge of humanitarian principles and the problems involved, b) political pressure on the part of 
the society on the political system for strengthening these principles and c) the ability and 
willingness on the part of the state actors to develop a politics of humanitarian aid.  
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The first barrier is the lack of knowledge of what humanitarian principles mean12. As 
the ICRC’ (1999) The People on War Report shows the overall knowledge of these principles 
is by far not as widely distributed as it should be, especially not in the donor countries. The 
German case which we have studied has shown quite a lack of knowledge and interest within 
the political system itself13. Slim (2001) also notes that the humanitarian organizations them-
selves have only recently begun to train their personnel in international humanitarian law.  
The second barrier seems to be the absence of a strong humanitarian pressure group. 
For that purpose the notion of history dependent institutionalism elaborated by March and 
Olson (1998) seems to be useful as a starting point. The underlying assumption is that the 
actors operate on the basis of a logic of appropriateness. Their actions and decisions are based 
on the notion of what is right but they do not exactly know what the result of their actions will 
be. Could a rights-based approach actually be achieved assuming that the actors actually fol-
low an appropriateness logic? And why a rights-based approach? From an ethical point of 
view philanthropy or charity may be highly valuable. Yet from a political perspective the 
rights approach has the advantage of explicitly formulating entitlements and obligations for 
all. Once specific rights are laid down it is clear what is legal and what is illegal.  
Following March and Olson (1998) one could plausibly argue that the natural carriers of 
such a politicization strategy in the donor countries in favor of a rights- based approach are 
the humanitarian agencies themselves. They probably pursue such a strategy of appropriate-
ness daily in the field. A good illustration of that is the behavior of humanitarian agencies in 
North Korea. The result was that some humanitarian agencies decided to leave the country 
while others preferred to stay, both justifying their behavior with humanitarian considerations 
(see Schloms, 2000).  
The logic of appropriateness, however, is flawed from the methodological if not theo-
retical point of view. Thus far it does not take into account simultaneous logics of appropri-
ateness, so to speak. We suggest the proposition we already have formulated, that the humani-
tarian organizations are caught between several fronts. They all seem to comply with that 
logic when it comes to humanitarian principles, the problem being that appropriateness leads 
individually to different results which excludes a collective solution. There is the competition 
                                                 
12  It is almost shocking to note how ignorant some high ranking officials - who we interviewed during field 
research on the Balkans - were with respect to international humanitarian law.  
13  This seems to be the case for the German parliament at large as well as the parliamentary committee of hu-
man rights and humanitarian aid where the interest is mainly in human rights issues. But ignorance is also 
found in the media, among others. The results will be published soon. 
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dimension. This implies a different logic of appropriateness in that some may decide to sub-
scribe to specific conditions set by ECHO, the humanitarian donor agency of the EU, for ex-
ample or by DFID, the British organization in charge of humanitarian aid14. What is right for 
one organization, i.e. compliance with donors’ rules, may be considered unacceptable by an-
other organization15. The raison d’être of humanitarian organizations being to support the 
victims has led to another almost counterproductive effect in the field which can also be con-
sidered as the product of the logic of appropriateness. As Leader (2000) shows the mainte-
nance of a humanitarian space in the field turns out to have become a major preoccupation. 
But the major effect is to safeguard the individual organization’s action space, which is some-
thing quite different from what humanitarian space means. That also means that the humani-
tarian organizations take over a role which is not theirs, namely to try to safeguard as much as 
possible of the humanitarian principles. They thereby take over a  political role which they 
can impossibly fulfill. The dependence from private donors tends to work in favor of a philan-
thropic or charity-based fund raising strategy, as Slim notes. This makes it easier to mobilize 
support. Therefore from a utilitarian strategy it may not be very wise to openly support a 
rights based approach. The latter is probably much less popular than one based on philan-
thropy or charity. An unintended effect which March and Olson (1998) refer to is the so-
called competency trap. If organizations grow and become more and more professional the 
tendency to emphasize skills takes precedence over specific norms. The SPHERE project, for 
example has been criticized exactly for these reasons in a joint declaration by Médecins du 
Monde and Médecins sans Frontières. 
Whereas the first four propositions point to the limitations on the part of the humanitar-
ian organizations to find a common ground which would facilitate the politicization of hu-
manitarianism the fifth one points to an unintended effect which further undermines the abil-
ity of the humanitarian agencies to contribute to the normative change through politicization. 
All these effects can be derived from the structural conditions in which these agencies are 
embedded. Possibly the lack of accountability further strengthens these structural effects. But 
all of this does not mean that these effects are causal and therefore inevitable. They are not. 
The actors have degrees of freedom with respect to their decisions and actions. They could 
change their behavior even though that would not be by itself a guarantee for success. 
                                                 
14  In the case of ECHO this is the Framework Partnership Agreement, in the case of DFID organizations active 
in Afghanistan will not get any funding.  
15  Whereas Médecins sans Frontières refused to accept any funds from the NATO countries during the Kosovo 
war others did not see any problem in accepting funding from them. 
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On the political side we can first of all observe the fact that the politics of coherence 
(ODI, 2000) referred to among others by Macrae has definitely led to a strategy which, unin-
tentionally or not, can actually undermine the normative foundations of humanitarianism. 
That is the result of a strategy which tends to instrumentalize humanitarian aid for develop-
mental and/or security purposes such as conflict resolution. Second, and this has to be seen 
clearly, humanitarian aid is not a terribly relevant policy field. It is at best only of short term 
interest within the political system16. If the assessment is correct, then the relevance of hu-
manitarian aid in terms of its impact for international order is underestimated unless we over-
estimate this role. Finally, the security policy field as well as the development assistance pol-
icy field have probably much greater weight in the political system than the humanitarian pol-
icy field. Finally, military interventions declared as humanitarian have now gained some 
prominence politically. As the Kosovo has shown military interventions no matter how they 
are justified, put the respective governments nationally under heavy pressure. This goes as far 
as to inhibit a militarily meaningful strategy17. As humanitarian action and humanitarian aid 
can be (mis)used to gain legitimacy and visibility in conflict situations it is much more com-
fortable from the political side to favor a neutrality-abandoned type of strategy rather than one 
which is much more problematic to justify publicly at home and to implement collectively 
abroad. 
Thus, at the state actors’ level the situation does not differ dramatically from the socie-
tal actors’ level in that a rights-based strategy seems not easy to implement if at all. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  A diplomat of the German Foreign Office characterized somewhat sarcastically if not bitterly the role of 
humanitarian affairs as the repair shop for atrocities and of low political salience. 
17  The air strikes against Yugoslavia can not be considered as militarily exceptionally successful. On the con-
trary. But this was due to politically defined limitations, i.e. avoid by any means fatalities.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
We have only begun to identify some of the complexities of the policy field of humanitarian 
aid. What we have basically been arguing for is the complementarity or security policy and 
humanitarianism. But we have also tried to make the point that both are two different types of 
activities. From the coherence perspective both security policy and humanitarian aid are part 
of some kind of global governance concept. That overall endeavor leads to different roles 
which should not, as we believe, be integrated at the expense of security or development, the 
latter being itself more and more guided by overall security concerns. The politicization of 
humanitarian aid is not a disadvantage even though the form it has taken is counterproductive 
from the governance perspective. That politicization is incomplete because the humanitarian 
side is still absent from the scene. Properly done this “humanitarian politicization” could try 
to reframe a proper definition of roles between state and nonstate actors as implied in the con-
stitutive complementarity relationship that characterizes the policy field of humanitarian aid 
suggests.  
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